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Abstract:
Casey O’Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear
phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of
speech perception – depending on how we define ‘hearing’ – phonemes either
don’t explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his
criticism of the semantic perceptual account (SPA).
Article:
Casey O’Callaghan has taken issue with what he calls the semantic perceptual account (SPA)
in various papers ((2009), (2010), (2011), (2015); this note relies mostly on (2011).) The
account considers the phenomenological difference between hearing a language we understand
and one we don’t, to be an indication that we actually hear meanings.1 O’Callaghan agrees that
there is indeed such a phenomenological difference, and, it seems to me, anyone who has ever
learnt a foreign language will concur. When we first hear the language, it appears like an
uninterrupted stream of sounds and what we discern in it is prosody and a couple of phonetic
elements, a particular vowel or consonant perhaps, that are salient – maybe because they recur
often or because they are unusual to our ears, or both. In the early stage of learning the language
when we are taught individual words, we begin to pick them out from the stream of sounds, and
with time, we gradually learn to discern most of the words and phrases, even if we don’t always
know what they mean.
The SPA attributes the phenomenological difference between the stream of sounds we heard
when we first heard the language and what we hear once we know it to the fact that we
understand it. Against this view, O’Callaghan argues forcefully that we don’t hear meanings.
His argument stresses that understanding what someone says is importantly different from
perceiving our environment auditorily. First, he states what it is to form a belief based on what
one perceives:
(PE) Imagining aside, I cannot have a perceptual experience in which I perceptually
entertain that something is the case, or is present, without having a perceptual experience
which purports that this is the case or is present. (2011:793)
1 In his (2011:783) he specifies that this is to be understood as being “auditorily perceptually aware of [an
utterance’s] meaning or semantic properties”.
So, the idea is that we cannot think we heard the door shut with a bang without having heard
the bang, for example. His argument now runs as follows:
(1) Understanding an utterance u which states that p means grasping the meaning of
u, namely p.
(2) However, when I hear u, I do not auditorily grasp, represent, experience or enjoy
awareness as of p.2
(3) So I don’t hear meanings.
Continuing our example, this means that when we hear you say “The door has banged shut”,
we hear that you said that the door has banged shut, but we don’t hear the bang of the door. But
the meaning of your utterance just is that the door has banged shut. Therefore, if that is not what
we hear, we don’t hear meanings. So we don’t hear meanings, and the SPA is mistaken.
O’Callaghan goes on to develop an alternative account to the effect that we hear phonemes that
we will get to below. Let us first analyse the attack against the SPA.
The first thing that is noticeable is that the argument only works where we can apply a naïve
verificationist truth-conditional account of meaning, i.e. for present-tense, indicative assertions
about things in our surroundings. It is evidently false for speech acts, but, it seems to me, also
for any utterance that expresses the speaker’s mental state. It seems quite plausible to claim that
hearing you say “Can I have a biscuit?” just is hearing that you want a biscuit. But O’Callaghan
is aware that he is caricaturing the account3 and it serves as an exposition of the line his
argument takes.
O’Callaghan’s modus tollens argument has a distinctly Pittsburghian ring to it, in that it starts
from the belief.4 In many contexts, this move skilfully evades the sceptic, but I propose to turn
the argument around and employ sceptical doubt to tease out the direction our investigation
needs to take.
Hearing what goes on around us may prompt us to form beliefs. We sometimes have reason to
doubt the accuracy of what we believe ourselves to be hearing and suspend judgment until we
have tested our belief. But we will test our beliefs differently when we are not sure we heard
the door bang shut from when we are not sure you said that the door banged shut. In the first
2 ibid.
3 At the “Perceptions and Concepts” symposium (Riga, 2013), he calls it a sophism. His talk can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OFcknu5tgo (retrieved on 26 April 2017)
4 I have argued (in a different logical form) against the conflation of hearing u with hearing p in Ruth Millikan’s
work (2013).
case, we may look whether the door is shut, or what else may have made the bang; in the second
case, we would ask you to repeat what you have said. If we checked whether the door is shut in
the second case, we would be testing the accuracy of your statement, not of our auditory
perception. Of course, we may be in a situation where we aren’t sure we have understood you
correctly (either because we had trouble discerning your words acoustically or because we don’t
know your language well) and we may be too shy to ask you to repeat and therefore prefer to
check the door instead. But doing this means that we assume a whole baggage of prior beliefs
– that you were trying to inform us of something and therefore truthfully described an event in
our surroundings (to give a rough summary) – and it does not alter the fact that we are in the
first place testing our understanding of your utterance, even if the way we are doing so is by
checking whether what we believe you may have said is actually the case. If, in the second case,
we find the door is still open, we will have a choice between thinking you were lying or we’ve
misunderstood you. In the first case, the choice is between thinking something else made the
bang or the door did bang shut but was then opened again.
So, taken like this, it is easy to agree with O’Callaghan that the object of perception in hearing
somebody say something is the utterance, not what makes the utterance true. This means that
the issue is between hearing and understanding.
O’Callaghan focuses on hearing. He asks: If we don’t hear meanings, what is the difference
between hearing a familiar language and hearing a language we don’t understand due to? He
points out that every language has its own distinctive system of sounds, not only in terms of
what sounds are used to make up words and how they combine, but also within what ranges
variation of those sounds is possible without changing the meaning of the word they constitute.
The smallest units of sounds in a language whose change makes for a change of meaning is
called phoneme. O’Callaghan stresses that human infants take a special interest in language5
and learn to discern phonemes of the language(s) they are born into very early, while at the
same time beginning to disregard non-phonemic differences in sounds. So, learning a language
means acquiring the skill to distinguish its phonetic structure at the expense of discerning
sounds that are not phonemic in any language we are familiar with – we learn to hear phonemes.
Backed up with examples that show that polysemy does not change the phenomenological
experience, O’Callaghan considers his explanation superior to the SPA.
5 This is surely less surprising than O’Callaghan seems to think (I infer that from how he stresses the fact)
considering that foetuses hear as of the end of the second trimester, and what they hear most, apart from
digestive and breathing sounds, is their mother talking (cf. Birnholz & Benacerraf 1983).
In order to assess his claim, we first need to define ‘hearing’ with respect to the phenomenal
experience it provides and how it relates to understanding. Since the demise of the unfortunate
sense-data theory, it seems to me that relative to issues like ours we have a choice between two
basic options. The first is a wide-reaching option that comprises the entire mental state of the
hearing subject caused by the auditory input, that I shall call the “thick option”. It builds on
O’Callaghan’s explanation that experience is to be understood “in the broadest possible sense,
so that it may encompass, for instance, sensory, perceptual, bodily, affective, emotional,
imaginative and even occurrent cognitive events or states” (2011:785), and phenomenal
difference as “a difference in what it is like for you as a conscious subject to have each
experience” (ibid.). Its focus is on the experience and what caused it. The second option
comprises merely the auditory impact our environment makes on us, the “thin option”. Its focus
is on the cause and its immediate effect on the perceiver.
The “thick” option therefore takes into account in a generous way what it is like for a subject
to be in a state of hearing certain sounds. For instance, it would regard the shiver going down
my spine at hearing a fingernail scratch a blackboard as part of what hearing that sound
comprises. The “thickest” option would include the recognition that the sound is produced by
a fingernail scratching a board in the phenomenological status of the subject.
In our example of a familiar language, this option would go far beyond discerning phonemes
and hearing speech as a sequence of words, with pauses, coughs, uhms and ahs. It would have
to comprise also the analogues to the shiver and recognising the fingernail. But what produces
the analogue of the shiver? There is the sound of the voice, which conveys the speaker’s
emotional state and which can produce an emotional response in the hearer. But that can’t be
all, for compare someone screaming “My knee!” with the same person in the same tone of voice
screaming “There’s a fire!” The first scream is likely to produce the immediate effect of
compassion, while the second scream will cause fear in the hearer. But these effects are, of
course, linked to understanding what is said. In fact, it seems to me that the analogue of
recognising the screech as the sound of the fingernail scratching the board is recognising the
scream “My knee!” as the sound people make when they hit their knees and thereby grasping
the meaning of the utterance. The “thick” mental state produced by hearing an utterance simply
comprises understanding what is said.
For support of this claim, since we are more accustomed to thinking about vision than audition,
let us take an example from seeing language, as it were, the Stroop test. It has names of colours
printed in colours other than the one they denote; for instance “red” would be printed in yellow
ink, “yellow” in green ink, “green” in blue ink, etc. The task is to tell the colour of the ink.
When a sheet of such words is shown to a person who can either not read or doesn’t understand
the colour words (because they are in a foreign language), the task is very easy. But for fluent
readers of the relevant language, it is really hard. When I tried it, I felt that the word I grasped
at a glance interfered with my perception of the colour of the ink. I had two contradictory visual
pieces of information and although I knew which one to go for, the other one was impossible
to block. The visual experience was equally immediate, and, moreover, concerned the same
issue. Now, if the meaning of words composed of written letters is grasped so quickly that it
interferes with the perception of colours, it is likely that the meaning of words composed of
phonemes would be grasped just as quickly.
Why understanding language can be as immediate as grasping anything else in perception is a
topic for another day. For the thick option, where the subject’s entire mental state resulting from
hearing a language utterance is taken into account, the Stroop test supports the claim that
understanding what the utterance means must be part of hearing it.
The thick option would then still have to deal with O’Callaghan’s argument. It can do so by
referring to the form / content dichotomy and give (PE) another twist: There is no way to
perceive the content of an utterance other than through perceptual experience of the form. But
the Stroop test is an indication that once we have acquired the relevant interpretive skills, we
immediately perceive the content, not the form, and it takes a big effort to block perception of
the content when we perceive the form.
So, on the “thick” account, SPA is right and O’Callaghan’s attack misses the point.
But O’Callaghan seems to favour some version of the “thin” option which keeps all cognitive
contributions to mental states out. It must therefore focus exclusively on the acoustic effect. But
as we are concerned with perceptual experience, we don’t want to speak only of the mechanical
effect: soundwaves hitting the eardrum at a certain Hertz rate and being transmitted to the brain
by the vestibulocochlear nerve, etc. That would be insufficient for an account of hearing; instead,
such an account must also include awareness of what is thus perceived, the “sensory mode of
presentation” (as Ayers puts it in a very similar account in 2004:249) – we hear music, we hear
noises and we hear someone speak. The thin account leaves out the subject’s mental state
beyond this bare minimum, but it packs the source of the sound into its concept of hearing (if it
didn’t, it would amount to a mere sense-data theory).
But if this is the idea, O’Callaghan’s account seems to involve too much. Phonemes are the
smallest phonetic units that determine meaning. They are as much semantic building blocks as
letters are in written language. Just as the thick account argued that we cannot hear phonemes
without hearing words and grasping their meaning, the thin account must now argue that we
cannot discern phonemes without having acquired the skill to do so; but this skill was acquired
jointly with knowledge of the relevant language. If the thin account wants to keep cognitive
mental states out, it must stick to form. But phonemes are the first step into content and cannot
be isolated from it by the hearer.
If the skill to discern phonemes is what makes hearing a familiar language phenomenally
different from hearing an unfamiliar language, that skill is inseparable from understanding the
language both in origin and in its employment when we hear an utterance. The thin account is
not entitled to take recourse to phonemes and without them, it can account for the difference
between hearing a person sing or speak, for instance, but not between hearing familiar and
unfamiliar languages. An example of what the thin account can deliver is hearing sounds in the
room next door and being able to tell language apart from music or the sounds an animal makes.
So, in spite of their importance in speech perception, phonemes are not the right tool to argue
against SPA. For the thick account of hearing, they don’t comprise enough, and for the thin
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